Promoting the Public Interest in the Digital Era by Geller, Henry
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 55 | Issue 3 Article 16
5-2003
Promoting the Public Interest in the Digital Era
Henry Geller
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons,
Communications Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Geller, Henry (2003) "Promoting the Public Interest in the Digital Era," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 55: Iss. 3, Article 16.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol55/iss3/16
GELLER.FINAL 4/9/2003 6:23 PM 
 
515 
Promoting the Public Interest  
in the Digital Era 
Henry Geller* 
The issue posed is whether in today’s media environment, the public 
interest is better served than at the time of the “Vast Wasteland” speech.1 
Clearly, it is in some important respects. For example, with cable’s 
increasing importance, there are more national news outlets and the terrific 
addition of the C-SPAN channels. However, I do not plan to explore this 
issue further. In my opinion, the more important question today is whether 
we should continue the present regulatory scheme for television 
broadcasting or adopt a radically different approach. 
Under the Communications Act of 19342 (the 1934 Act) and the 
Telecommunications Act of 19963 (the 1996 Act), the broadcaster is a 
short-term licensee obligated to operate in the public interest. Broadcasters, 
led by the National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”), have stated that 
they accept this social compact, that is, a commitment to serve the public 
interest in exchange for free use of the spectrum.4 But this public trustee 
content scheme raises serious policy considerations, especially in light of 
 
* Henry Geller is a former General Counsel of the Federal Communications Commission 
and had the privilege of working with Newton Minow when he was the Chairman. 
 1. Newton N. Minow, Television and the Public Interest, Speech Before the National 
Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961). 
 2. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Title III, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081. 
 3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 336(d), 110 Stat. 56, 
107. 
 4. See Doug Halonen, Spectrum Fees in ‘Rigor Mortis,’ ELEC. MEDIA, Feb. 14, 2000 
(quoting NAB President Eddie Fritts: “The deal is this: that broadcasters provide community 
interest and public service programming in exchange for a small slice of the spectrum”), 
available at http://www.craini2i.com/em/archive.mv?count=3&story=em42818878415697 
889; see also Kim McAvoy, Broadcast, Cable Unite Behind Senate Bill, BRDCST. & CABLE, 
June 13, 1994, at 42-43. 
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changed circumstances in the video distribution field. These considerations 
include the following: 
(1) The heart of the regulatory scheme is the presentation of public 
service programming. But this necessarily involves behavioral content 
regulation and thus First Amendment strains. Whatever public service 
program categories are used, for example, local, informational, 
nonentertainment, community issue oriented, or “specifically designed” to 
educate or inform children,5 definitional problems arise, particularly at the 
margins. Take the latter category, called core educational programming.6 
Educational or informational programming for children contains a strong 
entertainment component, and trying to separate the two components is 
neither possible nor appropriate; further, it can have a social purpose 
instead of being cognitively directed, and indeed, studies by the Annenberg 
Public Policy Center establish that almost all of the core programming on 
the commercial networks is of the social purpose nature.7 This can result in 
the claim that The Little Mermaid meets the definition of core educational 
programming because it shows little girls how to be leaders or be assertive. 
Controversy can and has arisen over programs like NBC’s N.B.A. Inside 
Stuff, with the network disputing the criticism that this was not core 
educational material by citing the support of two educational consultants 
who assisted in its preparation.8 This is but one example of the difficult 
First Amendment problems that can arise in this field.9 
(2) The objective is to obtain high-quality public-service 
programming. But the government cannot review for quality; that would be 
much too subjective. So we are dependent on the broadcaster to produce 
such high-quality programs. The noncommercial system has demonstrated  
 
 
 
 5. Children’s Television Act of 1990, § 303b(a), Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996, 
47 U.S.C. § 303b(a)(2) (2000). 
 6. See Policy and Rules Concerning Children’s TV Programming, Report and Order, 
11 F.C.C.R. 10660, para. 4, 3 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1385 (1996). 
 7. See AMY B. JORDAN & EMORY H. WOODARD, IV, 1997 STATE OF CHILDREN’S 
TELEVISION REPORT: PROGRAMMING FOR CHILDREN OVER BROADCAST AND CABLE 
TELEVISION 20-21 (Annenberg Public Policy Ctr. of the Univ. of Pa., Report Series No. 14, 
1997). This same report concluded that one-quarter of the programs cited by the commercial 
broadcasters “could not be considered educational by any reasonable benchmark.” Id. at 4. 
 8. See Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s TV Programming, Comments of 
NBC, Inc., MM Dkt. No. 93-48, at 6-7 (Oct. 16, 1995), at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/. 
 9. Thus, Federal Communications Commission Chairman Reed Hundt acknowledged 
that “[t]his definitional issue is . . . the crux of our rules and by far the most difficult.” 
Significantly, the Chairman stated that there was no problem as to the children’s 
programming of PBS. Reject Commercials on PBS—Hundt, TV DIG., June 16, 1997, at 7. 
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that it will strive to do that, even though it is expensive. The commercial 
system, under fierce and growing competition, has no such history or 
incentive.10 
(3) It is anomalous to be still applying the seventy-five-year-old 
public trustee content scheme to this one medium of video distribution, 
broadcasting, while powerful new media are soundly not under such 
content regulation. Thus, multi-channel video program distributors (chiefly 
cable and direct broadcast satellite (“DBS”)) serve 85.3% of U.S. television 
households.11 The vast majority of the public makes no distinction between 
basic cable (and DBS) channels and broadcast channels, with cable and 
DBS coming close to TV broadcasting in audience reception figures. Cable 
and DBS have hundreds of channels, with more in the offing in the digital 
era. Still to come is video streaming over the Internet. There are access 
requirements applicable to some of these new media, but none have public 
trustee content obligations of the nature imposed on broadcasting.12 
(4) The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has largely 
deregulated radio and television broadcasting.13 Thus, with the exception of 
core children’s television programming, the broadcast licensee sends only a 
postcard to the FCC at renewal time. This means that with the exception 
noted, eliminating the public-interest content requirement would not result 
in any change apparent to the viewing public. The broadcaster is supposed 
to present community issue-oriented programming, but this is a very mushy 
concept. The commercial television operator does present much local news, 
but this is done for solid business reasons—not to meet FCC regulations. 
There is also the presentation of public service announcements (but rarely 
in prime time), but again there is no FCC rule. 
In view of the above considerations, it makes excellent policy sense to 
adopt a new regulatory scheme for broadcasting as we enter the new 
century. There is still a strong need for the provision of public service 
programming—high-quality educational material, cultural programming, 
in-depth informational fare, etc. We should look to the noncommercial 
 
 10. JORDAN & WOODARD, supra note 7. 
 11. See Satellite Nipping at Cable Industry’s Heels, FCC Report Shows, COMM. DAILY 
(Warren Publ’g, Inc., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2, 2003, at 2-3. 
 12. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 
U.S.C. §§ 611-612 (2000)). 
 13. Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment 
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial TV Stations, Report and 
Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1005 (1984); Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358, 60 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 526 (1986). For a full discussion of the 
FCC’s long pattern of regulatory failure in the broadcast era, see Henry Geller, Public 
Interest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341, 343-45 
(1998), and the cases and articles contained therein. 
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sector to provide this high-quality public service—not to behavioral content 
regulation of the commercial system, which has been and will continue to 
be a failure in this respect. It follows that the noncommercial system should 
be more adequately funded to meet its heightened responsibility in the 
digital era;14 the commercial broadcasters should be relieved of their 
obligation to present public-interest content programming, and in lieu 
thereof, should pay a modest spectrum usage fee, which would go to 
supplement the current inadequate funds for public telecommunications. 
This would result in a policy structure that promotes the creation and 
distribution of high-quality public service, as against the present one that 
tries to overcome through content regulation the driving commercial force. 
First Amendment strains would be markedly reduced, and broadcasting 
would be treated like the other video distribution media. In particular, it is 
sound policy to bring broadcasting in this century within the same First 
Amendment jurisprudence as cable or print.15 
Because it makes use of the public streets, cable pays to the 
franchising community a fee of up to 5% of its gross revenues from cable 
service operations.16 With the ending of the social compact—with no 
obligation now to put profits second and public service first—broadcasters 
would pay the same modest fee, 5%, for their use of the public radio 
spectrum. Since the advertising revenues (national and local spot) of 
commercial TV stations was about $25 billion in 2000,17 this would garner 
the sum of $1.25 billion for public television. 
Just as Congress acted to change the regulatory paradigm for common 
carrier and related telecommunications in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, it is time now to change the public trustee content scheme for 
broadcasting. If, contrary to this recommendation, Congress decides to 
proceed on an evolutionary basis, at the least it should act in the radio 
broadcast field and in the area of children’s TV programming. The case for 
the above new policy is overwhelming in radio. There are more than 
 
 14. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC TELEVISION, QUALITY 
TIME? 152 (1993) (showing the amounts spent per capita on public broadcasting in 1992: 
U.S., $1.06; Japan, $17.71; Canada, $32.15; U.K., $38.56). It is because of this inadequate 
funding that so many public TV stations are going down the “commercial slope” with their 
so-called “enhanced underwriting.” With adequate funding, this pattern should be 
proscribed. 
 15. Cf. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636-41 (1994). 
 16. Five percent is also the fee decided upon by the FCC to determine what sums are to 
be paid the Treasury by the digital broadcasters for engaging in ancillary services. Fees for 
Ancillary or Supplementary Use of Digital TV Spectrum Pursuant to Section 336(e)(1) of 
the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 3259, 14 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 126 (1998). 
 17. Universal-McCann U.S. Advertising Revenues, 2000. 
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13,000 radio broadcast stations.18 Satellite digital radio is coming on 
stream. The Internet is a significant factor in radio already. Radio broadcast 
stations simply send a postcard at renewal.19 It is public radio that delivers 
in-depth informational programming, cultural fare, programming for the 
blind, etc. In these circumstances, it is clearly time for Congress to confront 
the issue of why there is a continuing behavioral content requirement as if 
radio were back in the early or mid-twentieth century—why it would not 
make much better policy sense to eliminate the public trustee obligation 
and to substitute some very modest spectrum fee, for example, 1% or 2%, 
to go to public radio, which is so inadequately funded. Commercial radio 
national and local spot revenues come to roughly $18 billion.20 
In the case of children’s TV programming, the present reliance on the 
commercial system is both inadequate and troublesome.21 Public television 
needs additional funding to fully and effectively implement its expansive 
and much-needed educational plans in the digital era (preparation, 
production, distribution, and publicizing). In the multi-channel digital era, 
it is greatly desirable to have a preschool (ready to learn) program, one for 
the school-aged child (6-11), another for adults, literacy, and for training, 
especially for teachers in the use of high technology. It would thus greatly 
benefit the national interest by making mandatory the voluntary policy of 
Section 303b(b)(2) of the Children’s Television Act.22 Doing so would 
relieve the commercial broadcasters of their obligation to present core 
children’s educational fare, and in lieu thereof, impose a very modest 
spectrum usage fee of, for example, 1%, which would garner roughly $250 
million to be used solely to assist in the implementation of the above multi-
channel educational activities. 
If the above evolutionary steps proved successful, Congress could 
then move to implement the policy on a comprehensive basis as to 
 
 18. News Release, FCC, Broadcast Station Totals as of Sept. 30, 2002 (Nov. 6, 2002), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/bureau_chief/fy2002st.doc. 
 19. Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 49 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 
3 (1981); Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 797, 50 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 93 
(1981); Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment 
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial TV Stations, Report and 
Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 56 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1005 (1984); Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358, 60 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 526 (1986). 
 20. See Universal-McCann U.S. Advertising Revenues, supra note 17. 
 21. See (1), (2), supra. 
 22. See Children’s Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303b(b)(2) (2000). This 
subsection provides that broadcasters who enable another broadcaster to present educational 
programming are to be given credit for this action at the time of filing for renewal. The 
provision has been little used. Unlike cable which has commendably supported the C-SPAN 
channels, broadcasters have no similar move to support the PBS ready-to-learn channel or 
other multi-channel educational activity. 
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television broadcasting. The above sets out the concept. There would 
clearly be much work as to the details. For example, the license term might 
be doubled or more, and Congress would have to decide upon multiple 
ownership provisions and the retention of content-neutral requirements 
such as equal opportunities or lowest unit rate. 
Forty years ago Newton Minow sounded a clarion call for commercial 
broadcasters to meet their public-interest responsibilities. At the same time, 
he wisely sought to promote public television, especially by fostering 
flagship stations in New York and Los Angeles. He has continued to push 
strongly for excellent public service to children because they represent the 
future of the nation.23 In my view, it is time now to acknowledge that we no 
longer should care whether or not the commercial broadcaster plays in the 
public service field—that instead we want the commercial broadcaster to 
pay for its use of the public spectrum so that public broadcasting can be 
enabled to make a needed maximum contribution to educating and 
informing children and the electorate. The motto should be: Play if you 
want, but pay you must. 
 
 
 23. See NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: 
CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1995). 
